INROADS ON THE NECESSITY FOR A
CONSUMMATED PURCHASE OR SALE
UNDER RULE 10b-5
The traditional application of rule lOb-5 has required that
there be fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of d
security. While the Birnbaum rule that a plaintiff be an actual
purchaser or seller has been debilitated and the definition of
"'purchaseor sale" considerably expanded, the necessity for
some consummated transaction in securities has remained
effectively unchallenged. This note explores the manner in
which the "in connection with" language of lOb-5 may be
extended to encompass securities frauds in situations involving
no consummated purchase or sale transaction.

Rule lOb-5,1 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the authorization of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 proscribes fraud in connection

with the purchase or sale of securities. Civil claimants3 under lOb-5,

however, have not been subjected to a rigid adherence to the
'17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967) reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in an act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
2 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964) reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange- . . . (b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Rule lob-5 did not expressly provide a civil remedy, but in Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the court recognized an implied civil remedy. The
court based its ruling upon the tort theory that a statute extends a cause of action to those

whose interests it was passed to protect.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

TORTS § 286 (1964).

Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q, is virtually identical in language
with Rule lob-5 except that it only applies to misdeeds in connection with the sale of
securities. Since section 17(a) eipressly provides for civil liability, recognition of the right to
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Depending on the policy sought to

protected,5

the courts, to varying degrees, have emphasized or
be
minimized such traditional fraud requirements as privity, scienter,7
and reliance.8 Certain restraints, however, have been imposed on
lOb-5 claimants. One of the most long-lived of these limitations
was established in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,9 in which the

Second Circuit ruled that the claimant must be a "defrauded
purchaser or seller"'0 in order to maintain his action under lOb-5.
Closely related to the Birnbaum purchaser-seller doctrine, but
distinct therefrom, is the question of whether a consummated
purchase or sale is a prerequisite for lOb-5 relief. This note will
examine the "in connection with" language of lOb-5 and the cases
which have interpreted that language in order to determine whether
lOb-5 is limited by a transactional requirement.
civil relief under lOb-5 in order to eliminate the disparity between the liability of sellers and
purchasers appears to be a logical extension.
Mut. Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1967); Stevens v.
Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965). For an examination of the common law
elements of fraud see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 100-03 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]. See also Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).
5A few of the sometime conflicting often unarticulated, policy considerations that might
influence a court's decision are (1) the court's concern that business executives seemingly
innocent of any intentional wrongdoing not be treated under the federal fraud statutes;
(2) the court's hesitance to expand federal corporate law; and (3) the court's desire to give the
fullest protection to the investing public.
91,317 (N.D. Ill.
8 Compare Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
1964) and Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). with
Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 218 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See generally 3 L.
Loss. SECURITIES REGULATION 1767 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; Comment,
Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule lOB-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine
of Privity. 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
,See SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Texas Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds sub horn. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962):
Note, Proofof Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule lOb-5. 63
MIcH. L. REV. 1070 (1965). But see Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964): ej. Dack v.
Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
"See. e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Ruder, Civil
Liability Under lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent? 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627, 678
(1963).
193 F.2d 461 '(2d Cir.), cert. denied. 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
0 193 F.2d at 464. But see McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 5 SEC Jud. Dec. 810
(E.D. Pa. 1948).
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The Birnbaum Purchaser-SellerDoctrine

The Birnbaum doctrine until recently presented a very
significant hurdle to 10b-5 claimants seeking to question the
existence of a transactional requirement. Indeed, the Birnbaum
purchaser-seller requirement had been interpreted by later courts as

determining the standing of a l0b-5 claimant to bring suit." Under
Birnbaum only a person who had been defrauded in connection
with his own actual purchase or sale of securities was entitled to

lOb-5 relief. The Birnbaum rule, however, has been significantly
emasculated under increasing academic, t2 administrative,'3 and

judicial 4 criticism. The Second Circuit itself has hastened the
demise of Birnbaum by three recent decisions 5 which expanded the
more traditional meaning of "purchaser" and "seller." These three

decisions led one district court to the conclusion that, even though
not explicitly overruled by the Second Circuit, Birnbaum no longer
"See, e.g.. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied.
389 U.S. 977 (1967); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 791 (8th Cir. 1967).
" See Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for lOb-5, 54 VA. L.
REV. 268 (1968); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule lOb-5, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 684 (1968). Professor Loss has suggested that the SEC could adopt rules
specifically aimed at the elimination of the Birnbaum doctrine. 3 Loss at 1469 n.87. '
For an analysis of the Birnbaum case which suggests that section 10(b) may be read to
afford protection for abuses in securities transactions without a limitation of the class of
plaintiffs to purchasers or sellers, see Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA.
L. REV. 725, 832-35 (1956).
"The SEC, as amicus, in both A.T. grod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 & n.3 (2d
Cir. 1967), and Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 633 & n.6, 635 (2d Cir. 1967),
argued that the Birnbaum doctrine was a judicially established limitation not necessarily
required by the language of section 10(b).
11Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), noted in 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 978
(1967). But see Knauff v. Utah Constr.& Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1969).
11A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (see note 50 infra and
accompanying text); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967). In Vine, the
plaintiff was allowed standing to bring his suit under lOb-5 even though he had not
participated in a securities transaction. Defendant had acquired 95% of the corporation in
which plaintiff was a shareholder. Defendant executed a statutory short-form merger but
plaintiff refused defendant's tender. Still holding his shares, plaintiff brought suit alleging a
violation of lOb-5 and the court granted him standing on the grounds that plaintiff, in effect,
was a 'forced seller" of his securities. Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967). In Symington the plaintiffs, minority shareholders of SymingtonWayne, sought to enjoin the defendant's tender offer by alleging certain lOb-5 violations. The
court ruled on the merits of the plaintiff's claim without consideration of the standing issue.
Clearly the plaintiffs were not purchasers or sellers. Disregarding the eventual refusal to
'enjoin the defendant's activity, importance should be given to the fact that the court decided
the issue on its merits, whereas 'Birnbaum gave the court ready basis for summary dismissal.
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could be looked upon as restricting the class of l0b-5 claimants to
actual purchasers or sellers. 6
The Interaction of Sections 3(a) and 3(a)(14) with Rule 10b-5
Since the decline of Birnbaum, the more important
consideration in examining the po'ssible limitation of lOb-5 to
transactional frauds is the statutory language of sections 3(a)(13) 7
and 3(a)(14).11 Section 3(a)(13) defines "purchase" to include any
contract to purchase or acquire, and section 3(a)(14) defines "sale"
to include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of. Arguably,
when these definitions are read into lOb-5, they require either a
binding executory contract for the purchase or sale of securities or
a completed purchase or sale before an action is available under the
rule. Only a few courts, all at the trial level, have dealt with the
question of the necessity of a consummated transaction in lOb-5
actions. In M.L. Lee & Co. v. American Cardboard & Packing
Corp.," the court upheld the right of a promisee. under an
executory contract to bring suit under lOb-5 for alleged fraud in
connection with an aborted contract whereby the promisor had
agreed to buy the promisee's capital stock. Although the court
phrased the issue in the case as whether lOb-5 required a
consummated purchase or sale,20 the court's resolution of the case
made it unnecessary to address this issue since such a transaction
was in fact found to be present. Relying on sections 3(a)(13) and
3(a)(14) as providing the statutory basis for the promisee's action,
the court found the existence of an executory contract for the
purchase and sale of securities which qualified the transaction
" Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y.

1967).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964) (emphasis added) provides: "The terms 'buy' and
'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire."
1115 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1964) (emphasis added) provides: "The terms 'sale' and 'sell'
each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
1936 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1964). Lee involved an underwriter who loaned money to a

corporation pursuant to an agreement between the parties whereby the underwriter agreed to
buy the corporation's stock prior to its "'going public."

The underwriter sued the

corporation on the loan and the corporation counterclaimed alleging that the underwriter
had violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in that he had refused to perform the contract for

the purchase of the corporation's stock. The court's decision is on the plaintiff's motion for
dismissal of the counterclaim for failure to state a claim under l0b-5.
" The Lee court stated the question raised by the case as being the following: "Does Rule
lOb-5 require a consummated purchase or sale for a claim to be asserted on the basis of
fraud?" 36 F.R.D. at 30.
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between the promisee and promisor as a "purchase or sale"within
the ambit of the Securities Exchange Act. 2' The significance of the
Lee case, therefore, lies primarily in the court's recognition of the
applicability of 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14) to section 10(b).
In Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co.,'2 the court upheld the right of
a customer to sue under lOb-5 for damages suffered when a broker
"sold" the customer non-existent securities. Even though there.
could be no completed transaction in such a case, the court
reasoned that lOb-5 proscribed fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities and that it would unjustly restrict the
phrase "in connection with" if this language were to be applied
only to consummated transactions. Further, reasoning that if the
defendant had "perpetrated lesser frauds, such as
misrepresentations concerning quality of stocks he recommended
. . .or excessive churning of an account to create commissions, ' ' 1
he would have clearly been within the ambit of lOb-5, the court
found it inconsistent to deny the plaintiff lOb-5 relief because "the
fraud was so substantial that [the] entire transaction .
amounted to complete conversions of the [plaintiff's] funds. ' 2 The
Goodman court, without citing any supporting cases or statutory
language other than the "in connection with" language of lOb-5,
was, willing to overlook the lack of a completed transaction in
securities in order to implement the protections accorded the
investing public by section 10(b) and rule l0b-5.1 In contrast to the
analysis in the Lee case, the Goodman holding was not centered
around the statutory definition of a purchase or sale under 3(a)(13)
and 3(a)(14) although a "contract to purchase" was clearly
present. The Goodman court apparently found the "in connection
with" language of l0b-527 to be all that was necessary.

21 Id.

at 31.
" 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
"The court finds no justification in the legislative history of the [Securities Exchange]
Act or in the cases for reading this phrase [the "in connection with" phrase of section 10(b)]
as if it read merely 'in the purchase or sale' rather than 'in connection with the purchase or
sale.' " 265 F. Supp. at 444.
21Id. at 445.
2 Id. at 444-45.
2 See notes 52 & 59 infra.
2See

note 23 supra.
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Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc. Undermines the lOb-5
TransactionalRequirement

Most recently the transactional requirement has been examined
by the district court for the Southern District of New York in
Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc.'s Although an earlier

case in the same district had suggested that an aborted contract
was an insufficient basis for an action under lOb-5,2 9 the Commerce
court explicitly disavowed the prior decision in holding that it is
unnecessary to prove a consummated"0 purchase or sale of securities
as a condition to a lOb-5 action for fraud.3
21290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Keers & Co. v. Am. Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). In
Keers. the plaintiffs were minority stockholders bringing suit as aborted sellers or defrauded
offerees foi the.breach of the majority shareholder's promise not to sell his stock without
securing an equally favorable price for the minority shareholders. The promisor died and his
executor sold his holdings in breach .of the contract. Plaintiffs admitted that, at the time the
contract was entered into, the promisor intended to fulfill his promise. Plaintiffs contended
that the fraud arose from the executor's intent not to perform the contract. Although the
court in Keers used language that could be interpreted as establishing the rule that aborted
sellers and defrauded offerees had no cause of action under IOb-5 because there was no
consummated transaction, see Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp.
715, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the Keers court qualified its ruling: "Where representations are
promissory in nature. . . the promisee may not recover unless there is proof that at the time
the promises were made the promisor had no intention of keeping them.." 234 F. Supp. at
203 (emphasis added). Therefore, the holding in Keers is not that aborted sellers have no 10b5 remedy but rather, in order to come under lOb-5, aborted sellers must allege that there
was fraud at the time of entering into the contract. The same restriction as to the necessity
of proving fraud at the time of entering into the contract was recognized by the Conmnerce
court. 290 F. Supp. at 720.
" There may be some question as to exactly what the Commerce court meant when it used
the term "unconsummated." Did the court merely mean that there was no closed
transaction-no actual transfer of securities-from the seller to the purchaser? If this
interpretation is correct an executory contract clearly within the scope of 3(a)(13) and
3(a)(14) as a purchase or sale would come under question as an "unconsummated"
transaction. More likely, the court's use of "unconsummated" referred to a transaction
where there was not even a section 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14) mutually binding contract for the
transfer of securities. Since the express statutory definition of "purchase" and "sale" would
be met if such a contract were found, in holding that an unconsummated transaction would
also suffice the court must have been directing its attention to something less than a
mutually binding contract. Also the proposition that there need not be a closed transaction
has been recognized for some time, as evidenced by several cases cited in A. BRooMeRG,
SEcURiTiEs LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5, § 8.8, at 221-22 & n.98 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as BROMBERGo], and would not seem subject to question. In this note, therefore, it has
been assumed that by "unconsummated" transaction the court meant a transaction that did
not meet the statutory definition of a purchase or sale contract under 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14).
See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
:1In support of its ruling that a consummated transaction is not needed in order to
21
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The Facts. The Commerce case involved a claim that Philip and
Ronald Purer, principal stockholders of Puretec, Inc., fraudulently
entered into an exclusive agency contract 2 with the Commerce

Reporting Company for the sale of Puretec's capital stock with
no intention of consummating the transaction with the purchaser

secured by Commerce if the Purers received a better offer through
their own secret negotiations. Commerce secured Granite

Equipment Leasing Company as a purchaser assigning to Granite
with the agreement of Puretec the purchase right to Puretec's stock.
When the Purers refused to sell to Granite and, in fact, actually

sold to VTR, Inc., Commerce brought suit seeking lOb-5 relief.
The Purers moved for dismissal contending that the plaintiff failed

to meet the dual requirements of rule lOb-5 in that it did not allege
fraud (1)"in connection with" (2) "the purchase or sale" of any
maintain a lOb-5 action for fraud, the Commerce court cites Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp.,
367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966), and Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), as well as both Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., see notes 22-27 supra and
accompanying text, and M.L. Lee & Co. v. Am. Cardboard & Packing Corp., see notes
18-21 supra and accompanying text. Opper involved a suit brought by a customer against a
brokerage house for failure to carry out the customer's order to sell certain securities while
disposing of large amounts of similar stock held by the brokerage firm. The customer
eventually sold the securities at a substantial loss. The Second Circuit, in a per curiam
decision, stated: "Failure to carry out the order while disposing its own similar stock was
not only actionable under the contract but also [was] a violation of the Securities Exchange
Act." 367 F.2d at 158. Because of the nature of the Second Circuit's consideration of the
issue, it is impossible to say on what basis the action was allowed. However, in view of later
cases, it would seem safer to say that the court's ruling stands more for the proposition that
there is no requirement under l0b-5 that the plaintiff's transaction be simultaneous with the
defendant's fraud rather than establishing that no completed transaction was necessary.
Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), presented a factual
situation very similar to that of Opper. In Stockwell the court's decision clearly stood for
the proposition that "'[s]ection 10(b) and . . . Rule lob-5 do not require that the purchase or
sale immediately follow the alleged fraud." 252 F. Supp. at 219. It would seem, therefore,
that both Opper and Stockwell were cited to support a concept that neither court had
considered in the resolution of the cases before them.
12The contract between Commerce and the Purers involved the granting of a purchase
right option by the Purers to Commerce. Commerce was not obligated to purchase the stock
of Puretec but merely had an option to purchase coupled with an exclusive agency contract.
The granting of the purchase right option was probably intended to facilitate Commerce's
procurement of a purchaser for the Puretec stock. The purchase right option enabled
Commerce to act as both principal and agent in obtaining a purchaser for Puretec. 290 F.
Supp. at 717. There was no value, see note 47 infra, flowing from Commerce to the Purers
for the purchase right option; rather, this option was part of the agency contract. This is not
to say that the contract between Commerce and the Purers was illusory. Commerce, as are
all exclusive agents, was under an obligation to use its best efforts in obtaining a suitable
purchaser for the Puretec stock: See I A. CORBIN, CONTRACrS § 144, at pp. 623-24 (1963).
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security since the alleged fraudulent agreement was never
consummated and therefore amounted to no more than an aborted
agreement to sell the stock of Puretec.
The Commerce Rationale. In rejecting the defendant's
argument,s the Commerce court looked to the agency transaction
between Commerce and the Purers as giving rise to an action for.
lOb-5 relief3 4 Drawing on the Goodman rationale, the court
reasoned that to disallow such an action on the original contract
between the parties would render meaningless the words "in
connection with" and would "artificially restrict the statute to
proscription of fraud 'in the purchase or sale' rather than 'in
connection with' the purchase or sale of a security." Pointing to
the language used in A.T. Brod & Co. v. PerloWl and SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.," the court reasoned that
Congress' purpose in enacting section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act was to protect investors by broadly prohibiting "all
fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities. ',s
The Significance of the Commerce Rationale. The significance
of the Commerce decision lies in the court's willingness to uphold a
lOb-5 claim founded upon a transaction such as that between
Commerce and the Purers, a transaction which involved neither a
completed transfer nor a consummated contract to transfer
securities. Actually the agreement between Commerce and the
Purers was merely a purchase right option arrangement and an
exclusive agency contract.39 While in form the assignment of a
3 Although the court did not rule in defendants' favor on the question of whether a cause

of action had been stated where there was no consummated transaction, it did dismiss tile
complaint for being "woefully deficient as to form." 290 F. Supp. at 719. The court's
objection was that plaintiff's allegations were "too skimpy" to satisfy even the lenient
"notice" pleading theory of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 290 F. Supp. at 720.

Plaintiff was given leave to amend, however, since the deficiency of the pleading appeared
'to be attributable to counsel's oversight rather than his lack of belief in the existence of a

factual basis.

... 290 F. Supp. at 720.

34290 F. Supp. at 718-19.
3
lfd. at 718.
31375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), noted in 1967 DUKE L.J. 894.
- 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
31290 F. Supp. at 718, quoting A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir.
1967). The Supreme Court used very similar language and reasoning in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (construing the Investment Advisers

Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-I et seq. (1964)).
1' See note 32 supra.
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purchase right to Commerce might be viewed as a contract of sale
satisfying the "purchase or sale" definition under 3(a)(13) and
3(a)(14),4' it was apparently not so treated by the court. If the
agency-purchase right contract were itself a statutory purchase or
sale, 10b-5 would have been applicable by satisfying the definitional
requirements of 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14) as a contract. The court,
however, found it necessary to utilize the in connection with
language to find a lOb-5 violation in a transaction which took
place preliminary to any actual transfer of securities or to the
existence of a mutually binding purchase contract.
The Commerce decision leads to two rather radical departures
from traditional lOb-5 limitations. First, by holding that a
consummated transaction is unnecessary, and not meaning thereby
that an executory rather than a completely executed contract will
suffice, the Commerce court undermines the transactional
requirement of 10b-5. Since a contract for the purchase or sale of
securities is a purchase or sale under the statute, the language
"unconsummated transaction" as used by the court must refer to
something less than a mutually binding executory contract. By
implication, the court's rationale supports the proposition that
where a claimant can prove damages, 4' reliance 42 and the
defendant's fraudulent intentV3 in connection with dealings 44 between
the parties in contemplation of the transfer of securities, a lOb-5
4 The cases that have considered the question of what sort of contracts come within the
purview of 3(a)(13) and (14) are not numerous. Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th

Cir. 1965) (contract for the distribution of stock of a corporation to be thereafter formed);
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1960) (contract for

the exchange of stock for capital assets held to be a contract to otherwise "dispose of"
securities); H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (under certain
circumstances, a contract for the merger of two corporations might involve a purchase and
sale of securities). See also New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 267 & n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
1'290 F. Supp. at 720. See note 65 infra.
12290 F. Supp. at 720. See note 63 infra.
41290 F. Supp. at 720.
" While in Commerce the pre-purchase dealings between the Purers and Commerce
involved an actual purchase right option and agency contract, it is not clear that only
negotiations of this formality will fall within the "in connection with" language. The
purchase right option-agency contract, classified by the court as any "unconsummated
transaction," consisted of more than unbinding negotiations but less than a mutually binding
statutory contract. It remains to be seen whether fraud in preliminary negotiations having no
binding effect upon any party %willfall within the ambit of lOb-5 proscription.
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action will stand regardless of whether any actual transaction in
securities has taken place.
Secondly, as a direct corollary to the first concept, the
Commerce ruling completes the emasculation of the Birnbaum
purchaser-seller doctrine. Under the Commerce-Purers agreement
Commerce was not a purchaser. The Commerce-Purers agreement
gave Commerce a "purchase right," 4 5 but Commerce at no time
received or was obligated to buy Purers stock. The court eschewed
the direct approach of finding that the holder of a purchase right
was a party to a statutory "contract to purchase" and instead went
into the discussion of consummation and the "in connection with"
language. Neither did the court treat the transfer of the purchase
right from Purers to Commerce as a transfer of "a security,"" for
under this analysis no discussion of consummation would have been
relevant since a completed transfer would have occurred. The court
apparently did not utilize this approach because the agreement was
in substance only an agency arrangement and perhaps because the
transfer was not made "for value."41 7 Thus, in allowing Commerce,
See note 32 supra.
46 Both the 1933 and 1934 acts define a purchase right itself as a security. See 15 U.S.C.

77b(l) (1964); 15 U.S.C. 78c(10) (1964). Arguably the transfer of the purchase right to
Commerce would be the sale of a security if this definition were strictly applied. The court,
however, did not treat it as such perhaps because it was not given "for value." See note 47

infra.
41The only definitional reference to "purchase" and "sale" in the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 is contained in 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14). See notes 17-18 supra for the language of this
section. On the other hand, the Securities Act of 1933 contains a much longer and more
detailed definition of "purchase" and "sale." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1964) reads in part: "The
term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest
in a security, for value. The term 'offer to sell,' or 'offer for sale,' or 'offer' shall include
every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest
" (emphasis added). This section evidences Congress' intent to
in a security, for value..
limit the statutory definition of "purchase" and "sale" to situations where meaningful
consideration flows between the parties to a contract for the transfer of securities. Because of
the limited attempt to define "purchase" and "sale" in the 1934 Act, it could be argued that
Congress expected the more complete definitional section of the 1933 Act to carry over in the
application of the 1934 Act. The Supreme Court in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967), indeed recognized that there might be some overlap in the definitional sections of the
two acts. Arguably under the 1933 Act definition of purchase and sale the transfer of the
purchase right from Purers to Commerce was not given "for value." True, Commerce did
promise to use its best efforts in finding a purchaser, but this consideration was given in
return for the exclusive agency rather than for the purchase right option which Commerce
had no interest in exercising. The purchase right was given merely as a convenience rather
than in return for Commerce's efforts as value. While one cannot gratuitously "give" a
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a non-purchaser under the court's analysis, to bring this suit, the
Commerce court clearly disregarded the limiting influence of
Birnbaum.
Only as an alternative holding's does the Commerce court rely
on the existence of the later Commerce-Granite contract as being
an actual consummated "purchase or sale" connected with the
earlier fraud. The court viewed the contract whereby Commerce
assigned the purchase right to Granite49 as falling within the
language of 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14) as a contract for the purchase or
sale of securities and, therefore,' qualifying as a consummated
transaction under the traditional purchase-sale definition. If the
court had been relying on the cause of action arising from the
Purers' fraud as an inducement to the Commerce-Granitecontract,
the case could have easily been fitted under the approach used by
the Second Circuit in A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow.5' In Brod the
security as a bonus along with something else that is paid for to take advantage of the "for
value" exemption, see H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW 58 (1966), the transaction here
was not an attempt to evade the statute but was in substance not a transfer for value at all.
11The Commerce court stated: "'The complaint's allegation of the sale and assignment to
Granite of the plaintiffs' contract with Purer provides an additional basis for invoking
federal jurisdiction based on § 10(b) of the Exchange Act." 290 F. Supp. at 719 (emphasis
added).
Several traditional approaches under which the holding of the case might be fitted were
available to the court. It chose, however, to utilize the Brod method of finding a related
fraudulent transaction only in the alternative, and made no use of the fact that the
Commerce-Purers transaction might itself be classified as a contract for the purchase and
sale of a security, see note 40 supra and accompanying text, or of the possibility of treating
the assignment of the purchase right from Purers to Commerce as a completed transfer of a
security, see note 46 supra and accompanying text.
11The Commerce court described the transaction between Commerce and Granite as an
"'assignment" of the 'purchase right" to Granite, a kind of transfer which when made
between the Purers and Commerce was viewed as an unconsummated transaction. See notes
30 & 32 supra. The difference here, however, seems to be that incident to the transfer Granite
agreed to exercise the purchase right by transferring 5,000 shares of its common stock to the
Purers, and the Purers agreed to accept this as consideration (290 F. Supp. at 717), thus
creating a binding contractual arrangement. While this contract was in both form and
substance a contract for the purchase or sale of securities, the prior Purers-Commerce
transaction was the transfer of a purchase right in form only, while in substance merely an
agency arrangement. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
- 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). In Brod the Second Circuit permitted lOb-5 recovery for a
broker who purchased securities for a defendant customer who intended to pay for the shares
only if the market price increased before the payment was due. The court found the
purchaser-seller requirement satisfied by looking solely to the later consummated
transaction-the broker's procurement of the ordered securities. The parallels between the
facts of Brod and Commerce riise the question as to why the Commerce court varied from
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Second Circuit looked to the defendants' fraud as the factor that
induced the plaintiff to purchase securities. It was tte plaintiff's
procurement of the securities from a third party in reliance upon
the defendants' fraud rather than the defendants' order that
constituted the "purchase" giving rise to the lOb-5 violation. If the
Commerce court had relied primarily upon this rationale, again
there would be no need for its discussion of the non-necessity of a
consummated purchase or sale of securities because clearly the
binding agreement with Granite satisfied the 3(a)(13) contract
requirement.
The Implicationsof the Commerce Rationale
The Commerce court, in choosing to grant the cause of action
under the more nebulous "in connection with" language, might
have been attempting to keep open the judicial door for future suits
brought under lOb-5 in which there was no formal contractual
relationship t between the parties but where the facts showed that
there was sufficient fraudulent activity "in connection with" the
unconsummated negotiations to justify lOb-5 relief.
In dealing with the unconsummated purchase or sale, the court
is defining the limits of lOb-5 application. To confine lOb-5 actions
to situations where there is a binding contract between the parties
the Second Circuit's rationale in Brod. In both cases, the plaintiffs were aborted offere=s. in

both, the courts looked not to the original negotiations between the plaintiff and the
defendant but rather to the plaintiff's subsequent transaction to determine the measure oJ

damages. Yet the Commerce court did not rely primarily on the subsequent contract between
Granite and Commerce as initially giving rise to the lOb-5 violation. The Brod court avoided
the issue of whether the broker would have had an action if he had not procured the
securities ordered by the customers. 375 F.2d at 397 a n.3. The approach of the Commerce
court would seem to be preferable in that it purports to establish the right of a defrauded
party to lOb-5 relief when there is fraud in connection with an unconsummated acquisition

or disposition of securities. The existence or non-existence of a subsequent consummated
transaction in reliance upon the original representations made between the parties is
important only as it goes to prove the damages the plaintiff has suffered. As seen in both the
Lee and Goodman cases, see notes 19-27 supra and accompanying text, there may be no

subsequent transaction entered into by the plaintiff in reliance on the defendant's fraudulent
activity although there is injury. Therefore, it is essential that lob-5 plaintiffs have an action
on the initial fraudulent activity in order to insure their rights to the protection available
under lOb-5.

51Admittedly the Commerce-Purers transaction involved a kind of formal contractual
arrangement, an option to purchase, but it was substantially less than a mutually binding
contract necessary to satisfy the 3(a)(13) definition or the court's definition of consummated
purchase. See note 32 supra.
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would unnecessarily exclude factual situations falling in the spirit of
lOb-5 investor protection 2 On the other hand, it could be said that
Congress itself has defined the outer limits of section 10(b) by
section 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14), 53 and the courts ought not to extend
their jurisdiction to claims not expressly committed to them by
Congress. Under this more conservative analysis, lOb-5 is
applicable only where the claimant can prove a completed transfer
or a mutually binding contractual arrangement for the transfer of
securities. When the Commerce court departed from the latter view,
it broke with the weight of authority in this area.5
52Although the presence of a binding contract for the transfer of securities may serve a
very valid evidentiary purpose as to the proof of fraudulent activity, the absence of a

contract would not seem to affect the policies of investor protection and maintenance of
market stability. Public confidence in the stability of the securities market was one of the
gravest concerns of Congress in the passage of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. "The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing
judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a situation
where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial

manipulation tends to upset the true function of the open market, so the hiding and secreting
of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value."

H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934) (emphasis added). Why, therefore, limit
lOb-5 coverage to those investors who have either closed the transaction or who are under a
mutually binding contract for the transfer of securities when there exist other seemingly more
valid lOb-5 limitations on the bringing of bogus claims? See notes 62-65 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of these other limitations.
'!The proposition that the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
should be strictly interpreted by the judiciary so as not to expand these acts into a body of
judicially contrived federal corporate law has been ably espoused by Professor David S.
Ruder in several articles. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of

Legislative Intent? 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a
Federal Law of Corporations By Implication through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185
(1964).
mAlthough one of the aims of this note is to point out the seeming inequity of allowing
lob-5 relief to an injured plaintiff who has actually consummated a purchase or sale (i.e.,
entered into a contract, or.actually completed the transfer) in connection with which the
defendant used some "fraudulent scheme" but denying that relief to an injured plaintiff who
has only contemplated and perhaps taken preliminary steps toward the consummation of a
securities transaction, most authority indicates that some completed transaction must have
been entered into by the plaintiff before his lob-5 claim will be recognized. See. e.g.,
A.T. Brod &Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 374 F.2d
627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.
1964); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952). The necessity for a completed transaction was expressed in M.L. Lee &Co. v. American
Cardboard & Packing Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1964), in which the court recognized the
applicability of 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14) to a situation involving an executory contract for the
purchase and sale of securities. The only two cases that question the transactional requirement
are Commerce and Goodman, which are examined in the text.
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Perhaps a hypothetical fact situation could best be used to
illustrate the potential reach of the Commerce rationale. Suppose a
customer places an order with a brokerage house for 1,000 shares
of stock which is then selling for twenty-five dollars per share. The
broker assigned to handle the transaction fraudulently induces the
customer not to purchase the stock. The customer, relying on the
broker's misrepresentation, leaves the office without having
purchased any stock through the brokerage house and without
giving the broker any compensation for his advice5 A few months
later, the stock is selling for thirty-five dollars per share and the
customer brings suit under lOb-5 alleging the above facts. 5
Arguably such a situation could come under the Commerce court's
interpretation of lOb-5 as extending relief in a situation involving
fraud "in connection with" an unconsummated purchase or sale. 7
To allow lOb-5 relief only to those investors who have completed a
transaction and not to allow the same relief to those investors who
have been fraudulently induced not to complete a transaction would
seem to be unjustified discrimination as well as a failure to
recognize that by the very language of the Act, fraud in connection
- For the purposes of this hypothetical, the broker is assumed not to receive any direct
compensation for his investment advice, but rather receives compensation only from
commissions earned on sales. This assumption is necessary in order to keep the problem
outside the coverage of § 2(6) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6
(1964) which provides: "it shall be unlawful for any investment adviser . . . (I) to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client" (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1), however, provides in part: "[This Act] does not include . . .
(c) any broker or dealer whose performance of such services [giving investment advice] is
solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special
compensation therefor.
... (emphasis added).
5 Of course the hypothetical plaintiff could have elected to buy the 1,000 shares upon
learning of the defendant's fraud and then brought his action within the traditional,
transactional fraud claim under lOb-5, alleging that defendant's fraud caused plaintiff to
delay acquisition of the stock. This alternative, however, would seem to recommend the
Commerce rationale even more. Why should the defrauded investor have to tie up his capital
and subject himself to the risks of the securities market in order to bring a suit where he can
prove the elements of fraud "'in connection with" the unconsummated purchase or sale of
securities? It would seem to be putting form over substance to require parties such as our
hypothetical plaintiff to actually purchase the stock. Also, plaintiffs such as the one in the
hypothetical most likely would have invested their money in other securities and, therefore,
might not have the funds needed to purchase the stock originally sought.
5 Clearly, the would-be plaintiff in the above -hypothetical does not come within the
Birnbaum doctrine but, as has been pointed out (see notes 12-16 supra and accompanying
text), this doctrine has been largely eliminated as a limitation not called for under the
language of lob-5.
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with"8 the purchase or sale rather than fraud in the purchase or sale
is prohibited. Rule 10b-5 was aimed not only at the prevention of

fraud in relation to purchases of securities59 but also to prevent
fraud that affects the stability of the securities market.06 Arguably,
fraud that induces an investor not to transact in securities has just

as injurious an effect on the stability of the market as does fraud
which induces an investor actually to buy or sell securities. The

expansion of l0b-5 to claimants involved in unconsummated
transactions would not only provide the fullest measure of investor
protection but would increase the number of private actions which

operate as a significant economic deterrent to securities fraud.6 '

Of course, the suggestion of this extension of 10b-5 is likely to

raise the counter-argument that many non-purchasing investors
would seek to benefit whenever lOb-5 fraud is uncovered. The

opponent of such an extension might point to the innumerable nonpurchasers who might bring suit in the aftermath of a successful
lOb-5 action in a situation like that presented in-SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co."2 in which certain corporate insiders were found guilty
Commerce court's reliance on the "in connection with" language to allow a lOb-5
'The
action where no consummated contract existed suggests that this language may be
interpreted to refer to activities and negotiations surrounding a contemplated purchase or
sale transaction which is never finalized.
11Presidential Message, S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934); see Cooper v.
North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); New Park Mining Co. v.
Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Pettit v. Am. Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
See note 52 supra.

"See generally J.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); Fratt v. Robinson, 203
F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953): "[N]othing . . . would tend more . . . to deter fraudulent
practices in security transactions . . . than the right of defrauded sellers or buyers . . . to

seek redress in damages in federal courts."
62401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). In TGS the Second Circuit used language which might
have some significant bearing on the transactional requirement of l0b-5. In dealing with the
SEC's request for injunctive relief against the corporate defendant's release of public reports
containing misrepresentations as to the extent of certain mining discoveries, the court ruled
that it was not necessary that the corporation actually transacted in its own securities in
order for the court to grant the relief sought. The court stated: "[C]omparisons of Section
10(b) with the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (§ 12(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2), "...

[offers or] sells a security by means of

...

';

§ 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)

in the [offer or] sale of any securities to obtain money or property by means of...
[language in brackets was added in 1954 amendments]), and with the 1936 antifraud
amendment of Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (§ 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(l) . . . effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase
or sale of, any security .

.

.') denonstrate that when Congress intended that there be a
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of lOb-5 fraud by withholding and understating information
concerning an ore discovery. Numerous claimants might allege that
they had contemplated purchase of TGS stock but were induced
not to purchase by the unfavorable (and fraudulent) statements
released by the company's management. The argument, however,
can be met by requiring that clairants in situations involving
unconsummated transactions carry the substantial burden of
proving reliance,63 causation, 4 damages" and that they belong to
participation in a securities transactionas a prerequisiteof a violation, it knew how to make
that intention clear....
"Therefore it seems clear from the legislative purpose . . . that Congress when it used the
phrase 'in connection with a purchase or sale of any security' intended only that the device
employed, whatever it might be, be of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely
thereon, and, in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a
corporation's securities. There is no indication that Congress intended that the corporations
or persons responsible for the issuance of a misleading statement would not violate the
section unless they engaged in related securities transactions.
Id. at 860 (emphasis
added).
The more conservative view of the above quoted language would restrict it to the
proposition that a third party-not himself transacting in securities-may incur liability by
fraudulent activity which could reasonably be expected to be relied upon to induce others and
which in fact does induce others to transact in securities. More broadly construed, the above
quoted language might be used to question the necessity of any transaction in securities by
anyone where there has been a fraudulent attempt to induce or discourage a purchase or sale.
If the defendant engages in fraudulent activity "that would cause reasonable investors to rely
thereon, . . . and . . . [would] cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities,"
401 F.2d at 860 (emphasis added), then the defendant is liable for any damages suffered by a
plaintiff whether or not such plaintiff has actually transacted in the security, The emphasis is
placed on the word "would"; had the court been requiring a transaction by someone, a
better choice of words might have been "that [does] cause them to purchase or sell"
securities.
It does not necessarily follow under a liberal interpretation of this language that the fraud
must be directed toward inducing a purchase or sale. It would seem that lOb-5 should
likewise be applied to fraud directed at discouragingrather than inducing a purchase or sale,
since in both situations no consummated transaction is present, yet the same need for
investor protection exists. In view of the nature of the TGS ruling (an action for injunctive
relief sought by an administrative agency), perhaps too much should not be read into the
court's language, but, at least, the court did question the transactional requirement of lOb-5
as related to the liability of the defendant.
Although, as pointed out in note 7 supra and accompanying text, reliance has been
dispensed with in certain cases (especially those involving non-disclosure transactions where
the transfer was made via a national exchange), reliance still remains a vital limitation of
lOb-5 actions. Reliance has been thought of as essential in direct-dealing non-disclosure
cases. See, e.g.. Kohler v. Kohler, 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962), affd, 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963). See BROMBERG § 8.6, at 209-12; 3 Loss 1765-66.
" Barnet v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). But see Weber v. Bartle,
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,910 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1967).

See

BROMnBERO

§ 8.7, at 213-20.

11The consideration of damages in relation to an action on an unconsummated purchase or
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the class meant to be influenced by the defendant's activity 6 All of
these limitations have judicial precedence and could be employed to

prevent bogus claims.
Perhaps, in view of the language of 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14), only a

statutory amendment, or continued reliance upon the Brod "related
transaction" approach, could effectuate the suggested extension of

lOb-5 to cover situations involving uriconsummated transactions
where the parties have not entered into a mutually binding contract.
It would not be unreasonable to anticipate, however, that a court

presented with the proper fact situation could rely upon Commerce
and Goodman as establishing a right of action under lOb-5 where

there has been nothing more than fraud in connection with a
67
contemplated but unconsummated purchase or sale of securities.

sale of securities is very important. If the courts limit recovery by the so-called federal "outof-pocket" measure of actual damages, there would be no recovery for a plaintiff such as the
one in the hypothetical. He has suffered no out-of-pocket damages. For an examination of
this measure of damages, see PROSSER § 105, at 750. Prosser points out, however, that twothirds of the states recognize a "loss-of-bargain" measure of damages in actions for fraud.
Id. at 751. The willingness of federal courts to examine all the pertinent circumstances in
arriving at a reasonable approximation of the damages suffered by plaintiffs claiming lob-5
relief seems to lead to the conclusion that the federal courts are not committed to any one
concept of damages under l0b-5. Compare Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962), with Mysel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) and Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). For an
examination of the measures of damages under l0b-5, see Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The
Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchaseand Sales Cases. 63 Nw.
U.L. REv. 423, 427-29 (1968); Note,. Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under
Rule lOb-5. 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 165.
"At common law, courts have traditionally limited the class of possible claimants for
misrepresentation to those whom the defendant had desired to influence in the manner which
had occasioned the damages. See PROSSER § 102, at 717 & n.83. This limitation was
imposed on actions in deceit for the obvious reason that the class of persons who may have
learned of the misrepresentation and were influenced thereby, would be so enormous as to
place a burden of liability on the defendant out of proportion to the fault involved. See
Keeton, The Ambit of a Fraudulent Representor's Responsibility, 17 TEX. L. REV. I (1938).
11A fertile area for use of this theory could be in the derivative suit where corporate
directors have "'fraudulently" discouraged the corporation from making a purchase or sale
for their own selfish ends such as maintaining control or purchasing for their own accounts.
See Note, FiduciarySuits Under Rule lOb-5, 1968 DUKE L.J. 791.
EPILOGUE: It is interesting to note that in SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 4"53 (1969), the
Supreme Court for the first time considered the "purchase and sale" language of lob-5. The
Commission brought suit seeking to unwind a merger between two insurance companies
where one company had solicited shareholder approval of the transaction by use of material
misrepresentations and omissions in violation of lOb-5. In granting the SEC relief, the Court
stated that "[w]hatever the terms 'purchase' and 'sale' may mean in other contexts, here an
alleged deception has affected individual shareholders' decisions in a way not at all unlike
that involved in a typical cash sale or share exchange. The broad antifraud purposes of the
statute and the rule would clearly be furthered by their application to this type of situation."
Id. at 467.

